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(E.) The question of conciliation. See enclosure 7 in Governor's Confidential despatch of the 2nd October, for the demands of Canton.
The only body in Canton with which my Government can negotiate is the Government of Canton. Apart from Canton workmen (with whom the Colonial Government has no concern) the Strike Committee consists of former Hong Kong workmen (whose return we do not desire, since the Colony is better off without them). The advisers of the Committee are Red Russians. The Colonial Government cannot possibly conduct negotiations with such a body. If such negotiations were begun our prestige would suffer to such an extent that the future good Government of the Colony would be imperilled. Furthermore, a very detrimental effect would be produced on British interests in Shanghai if the Kuang Tung anti-British boycott were to end in the humiliation of the Colony or in any way (e.g., by the payment of blackmail in the guise of strike pay, by the reinstatement of strikers, or the payment of compensation for loss) which would enable the Government of Canton, the Strike Committee or the Red Russians to proclaim the settlement as a success. Moreover, such an ending would constitute a direct incitement to the renewal of anti-British agitation at Shanghai and in other places.
Canton grievances. In a communiqué to the Press (copy sent home with my secret despatch of the 28th of January) the (7) Commissary of Foreign Affairs has recently declared that the strike was begun by workers in the Colony, primarily as a protest against the British Government for the shooting which occurred on the 23rd of June at Canton, and not for economic reasons.
Neither the strike nor the boycott which has followed it have been caused by any actions or neglect by the Colonial Government or the inhabitants of the Colony. Hong Kong is in advance of China in legislation for the benefit of labourers Economically, workmen in the Colony are better off than in China It is decidedly my intention to exert my personal influence to induce the Government of Canton to turn for help to Britain rather than to Russia. In this connection I would refer you to my despatch of the 24th of December (Secret), paragraph 3, my despatch of the 8th of January (Secret), paragraph 2, and my despatch of the 20th of January (Secret), paragraph 10. We are, however, decidedly against an annual payment to Canton from Boxer funds. In the allocation of Boxer funds, in our opinion, no regard should be had to the Canton situation, and Kuang Tung should not receive any payment while the boycott lasts. Delegation should not, in our opinion, proceed to Canton, so long as relations between the Government of that place and Great Britain continue to be abnormal. We fear that there is no real desire for concilia-
tion on the part of the Government of Canton, which is only inclined to put an end to the boycott on terms which would be humiliating to the Colony and Great Britain.
A settlement would probably be welcomed by the bulk of the population of Canton, but they are terrorised by the Strike Committee and are incapable of giving expression to their wishes. In Central and Northern China anti-British feeling has subsided, but as the result of Bolshevik influence over the Government of Canton, there has been no improvement in this respect in Kuang Tung. The suppression by the local Chinese Authorities of the extremist elements in Central and Northern China, has rendered possible there the realisation of the policy of conciliation.
The Government in Kuang Tung, on the other hand, actually consists of the extremists.
On the 4th of February I stated in the Legislative Council that the Governnient of Canton is expected and required by my Government to stop the illegal activities of the Strike Committee; that we consider that the responsibility rests on that Government, and that we are still willing to negotiate an honourable and permanent settlement with the Government of Canton. So far the Canton Government has declined to enter into negotiations. If they maintain this attitude in spite of my last offer, and should no success attend the action under the Washington Treaty which I have suggested, we shall have to consider whether the risk involved in separate warlike action in Kuang Tung should not be taken. In the event of war becoming unavoidable I invite reference to my despatch of the 19th of January (Secret). We hope that in any statement which may be made in Parliament the suggestion in the last sentence of the telegram of the 1st of Februar from His Majesty's Minister at Peking will be emphasised.*
⚫ the patience of Ilis Majesty's Government may at length be exhausted.
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III.
Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Hong Kong.
(Sent 4.5 P.M., March 4, 1926.)
YOUR telegrams of the 26th January and the 6th February have been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who have reached the following conclusions:-
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(1) Question of actual hostilities with Canton has not yet arisen. It is highly problematical whether on balance British interests would profit from hostilities, and in the circumstances and in view of attitude of other Powers it is clearly desirable that the question should not arise.
(2) Pressure on Moscow. I am sending you a despatch dealing generally with the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Bolsheviks (see your secret telegram of the 13th January). Here I need only say that the general policy is to leave them alone and let them discredit themselves. Our view is that use of force would tend to prolong their influence and would merely aggravate position, and that the right course is to content ourselves with showing them up in their true colours whenever possible.
(3.) League of Nations It could hardly be expected that League would unanimously condemn the Canton Government without giving the latter a chance to be heard, and they would no doubt jump at the chance of entering into a public discussion about their grievances before representatives of all the nations of the world. Moreover, such discussion could hardly be confined to Canton question; the introduction of extraneous Chinese matters would be almost a certainty, and the situation would not be likely to be eased by the resulting publicity. It would in any case seem a hazardous course to bring so involved a question before an Assembly which is unfamiliar with the special conditions obtaining in China and the Far East, and it might well be that both His Majesty's Government and the Hong Kong Government would be highly embarrassed by the consequences. It must not be forgotten also that any such action would be tantamount to according the Canton Government some measure of international recognition, a proceeding which strikes us as undesirable at present. For these and other reasons His Majesty's Government consider that an appeal to the League would be inexpedient,
(4) Conciliation. So far as our information serves us, it would not appear that further efforts in this direction are likely to serve any useful purpose in existing circumstances.
(5.) Assistance to anti-Communist leader. His Majesty's Government can see no element either in Kuang Tung or elsewhere the support of which would hold out any prospect of success. Moreover, the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government's advisers in China is to maintain policy of neutrality, and to reverse our policy in the face of this advice might entail gravest consequences.
(6.) It would appear, therefore, that there is only one active policy remaining which merits further examination, namely, the question of organising an international counter-boycott against Canton. It is very doubtful, however, how far the various Powers, even if genuinely desirous of restraining their nationals, possess legal rights to do so, and apart from further reasons referred to below, it is clear that the proposal is open to serious difficulties, both practical and theoretical.
His Majesty's Government fear, therefore, that they are forced to the conclusion His that there is no alternative at present to a policy of peace and moderation. Majesty's Government fully realise the grave difficulty and loss to which Hong Kong has been exposed, and will continue to investigate every possible line of action. take this opportunity of assuring you that the tact and discretion which you have displayed are highly appreciated by His Majesty's Government and of conveying
you, and. to you an expression of our satisfaction at the manner in which departure, Fletcher have coped with a situation that is baffling in the extreme Should any further courses of action suggest themselves to you I look to you to bring them to my notice
up
to his
The suggestion made in your telegram of the 26th February has been receiving consideration, but owing to divided attitude of Powers and to delicacy of Customs situation generally, I fear that there is little likelihood of its adoption.-AMERY.
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